Abstract: Though fundamental to innovation and essential to many industries and occupations, individual creativity has received limited attention as an economic behavior and has historically proven difficult to study. This paper studies the incentive effects of competition on individuals' creative production. Using a sample of commercial logo design competitions, and a novel, content-based measure of originality, I find that intensifying competition induces agents to produce original, untested ideas over tweaking their earlier work, but heavy competition drives them to stop investing altogether. The results yield lessons for the management of creative workers and the implementation of competitive procurement mechanisms for innovation.
same limitations. Erat and Gneezy (2016) evaluate subjects' creativity in a puzzle-making task under piece-rate and competitive incentives and find that competition reduces creativity relative to an incentive-free baseline. Charness and Grieco (2018) in contrast find that highpowered incentives increase creativity in closed-ended creative tasks and have no effect on creativity in open-ended tasks. In both studies, creativity is scored by judges without guidance or a standardized definition, which leads to low inter-rater reliability. Rather than relying on subjective assessments, Bradler et al. (2018) study the effects of tournament incentives and gift exchange on creative output with an unusual uses task -where subjects are asked to think of productive uses for a common household object (e.g., a tin can), and creativity is measured by the statistical infrequency of each answer. In this case, the authors find that tournaments increase creative output relative to both gift exchange and an incentive-free baseline, though the empirical methodology makes it hard to distinguish an increase in originality (novel uses) from an increase in output alone (total uses). This paper makes several important departures from this body of research. The logo design competitions studied here provide a field setting in which real creative professionals are competing for prizes of significantly greater value than observed in the existing lab-based studies.
They also provide a setting where originality can be objectively measured with content-based assessment. Additionally, in contrast to much of the literature, it is not creativity per se that is being rewarded, but rather product quality: as in most product development settings, creativity here is a means towards an end, rather than an end in and of itself. Most importantly, however, this paper studies competition as a continuously-varying rather than binary treatment. In practice, competition is not a uniform condition, and the fact that the implementation of competitive incentives varies across the previously-cited studies might perhaps even explain their divergence.
At the heart of this paper is a set of empirical results on the originality of submissions into the sampled tournaments. To the extent that being creative is risky and its outcome uncertain, as the model below will propose, the paper is also connected to the economics literature on 7 00831 9
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology choices over risk in competition. Cabral (2003) and Anderson and Cabral (2007) show that in theory, laggards will take actions with higher-variance outcomes, consistent with the intuition of needing a big hit to catch up or, in the extreme, of having nothing to lose. Similar behavior has been observed among investment fund managers, who increase fund volatility after a midyear review which reveals them trailing their peers' performance (Brown et al. 1996) or when trailing the market (Chevalier and Ellsion 1997) . In additional related work, Genakos and Pagliero (2012) study the choice over how much weight to attempt across rounds of dynamic weightlifting tournaments, and interpret the decision as a choice over risk. The authors find that whereas moderate laggards increase risk, distant laggards reduce risk -a result at odds with the existing theoretical literature and the evidence from this paper, which indicate that more distant laggards prefer greater risk, conditional on participating. The interpretation, however, may be limited by the difficulty of empirically distinguishing a choice of risk from a commitment to a specified level of effort in the weightlifting context.
An additional literature to which this paper relates is the long-running literature in economics on product market competition and innovation (see Gilbert 2006 and Cohen 2010 for summaries). Since Schumpeter's (1942) contention that market power is favorable to innovation, researchers have produced explanations for and evidence of positive, negative, and inverted-U relationships between competition and innovation in a variety of markets -though the literature is complicated by differences in definition and measurement, challenges in econometric identification, and institutional variation. In a seminal contribution, Aghion et al. (2005) predict an inverted-U effect of product market competition on step-by-step innovation, and Aghion et al. (2014) find support for the predictions of this model in a lab experiment designed to mimic its features. There are, however, a few key differences between this paper's setting and the Aghion et al. (2005) model, the most important of which are the emphasis on individual creative behavior and the tournament context, where innovation is continuous and the intensity of competition is determined by relative performance differences, rather than by an exogenous degree of collusion in the product market.
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Theoretical Framework
The preceding literature explains creativity and its motives primarily through narrative psychological constructs, rather than economic forces. Yet creativity can also be interpreted as an economic behavior, insofar as it involves a choice over uncertainty. This section demonstrates how this idea can be operationalized in a relatively simple tournament model whose features resemble the empirical setting. The results are presented in partial equilibrium to bring into focus the tradeoffs facing agents in such a setting, which both guide the empirical analysis and offer a framework for interpreting the evidence that follows.
Suppose a risk-neutral principal seeks a product design. Because R&D outcomes are uncertain and difficult to value, the principal cannot contract directly on performance. It instead sponsors a tournament to solicit prototypes from J risk-neutral players, who enter designs sequentially and immediately learn of their quality. Each design can be either original or adapted from the blueprints of previous entries; players who choose to continue working on a given design at their next turn can re-use the blueprint to create variants, with the original version remaining in contention. At each turn, the player must decide whether to continue investing and if so, whether to create an original design or tweak an earlier submission. At the end of the tournament, the sponsor awards a winner-take-all prize P to its favorite entry.
Let each design be characterized by latent value ν jt , which only the sponsor observes:
where j indexes players and t indexes designs. In this model, β jt represents the design's quality, which is revealed by the sponsor's feedback, and the latent value is a function of revealed quality and an i.i.d. random shock, which reflects idiosyncracies in the winner selection process. To hone intuition, further suppose each player enters at most two designs. The type-I extreme value error leads to logit choice probabilities for each design (see Train 2009), such that player j's total probability of winning is:
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where µ j ≡ k =j (β k0 + β k1 ) is the competition that player j faces in the contest. This function is concave in the player's own quality and decreasing in the quality of her competition.
Every player's first design in the contest is inherently novel, and entry is taken for grantedin theoretical terms, each player is endowed with their first submission. At their subsequent turn, they have three options: they can exploit (tweak, or adapt) the existing design, explore (experiment with) a radically different design, or abandon the contest altogether. To elaborate on each option:
1. Exploitation costs c > 0 and yields a design of the same quality, resulting in a second-round design with β j1 = β j0 and increasing the player's probability of winning accordingly.
2. Exploration costs d ≥ c and can yield a high-or low-quality design. With probability q, it will yield a high-quality design of β H j1 = αβ j0 , and with probability (1 − q) it will yield a low-quality design of β L j1 = 1 α β j0 , where α ≥ 1 is the exogenous degree of exploration. 3. Abandonment is costless: the player can abstain from further investment, leaving the player's probability of winning unchanged, as her previous work remains in contention.
In this context, feedback has three effects: it informs each player about her first design's quality, influences her second design, and reveals the level of competition she faces. Players use this information to decide (i) whether to continue participating and (ii) whether to do so by exploring a new design or re-using a previous one, which is a choice over which kind of effort to exert: creative or rote.
Conditions for Exploration
To further simplify notation, let F (β 1 ) = F (β 1 |β 0 , µ) denote a player's probability of winning when her second submission has quality β 1 , given an initial submission of quality β 0 and competition µ (omitting the j subscript). For a player to produce an original design, she must prefer doing so over both exploiting the existing design and abandonment:
(3.1)
(4.1)
These conditions can be rearranged and written as follows:
In words, the probability gains from exploration over exploitation and abandonment must exceed the difference in cost, normalized by the prize. If the difference in the cost of exploration versus exploitation is small relative to the prize, as it likely is in the data (e.g., see Gross 2017), the choice between them reduces to a question of which choice yields the greater increase in the player's probability of winning.
Effects of Competition
This modeling infrastructure leads directly to the focal propositions, which bring into focus how competition affects incentives for exploration. 4 To simplify the presentation, we will that when µ j is high, exploration has greater expected benefits than exploitation, whereas when µ j is low, the reverse holds. The second proposition states that as µ j grows large, the benefits of a second design decline to zero. Because effort is costly, players are therefore likely to abandon the contest when competition grows severe.
. Then, there exists a µ * such that for all µ j < µ * ,
and for all µ j > µ * ,
Proposition 2. The returns to a player's second design decline to zero as µ j −→ ∞.
Proofs are provided in Appendix A. The necessary condition for competition to motivate exploration is that q ∈ 1 1+α , 1 2 , which holds if and only if original submissions are in expectation higher-quality than tweaks, but successful outcomes are nevertheless improbable (see Appendix A) -in other words, that exploration is not only risky, but also high-return.
When this is the case, the first proposition shows that competition can provoke exploration as a strategic response, a result which is similar to the findings of Cabral (2003) 2 Setting, Data, and Identification I collect a randomly-drawn sample of 122 logo design contests from a widely-used online platform to study how creative behavior responds to competition. 7 The platform from which the 5 Altogether, the model proposes that incentives for exploration are greatest at intermediate levels of competition (see Appendix A). Mathematically, the result is driven by the curvature of the success function, which rises and then flattens with competition. Only at intermediate levels of competition does the function have adequate curvature to make the returns to exploration both larger than those to exploration and large enough to exceed the cost.
6 From a mechanism design perspective, this incremental risk could be mitigated if players were allowed to choose whether to replace the first submission with the new one after realizing the new submission's quality draw.
7 The sample consists of all logo design contests with public bidding that began the week of Sept.
3-9, 2013 and every three weeks thereafter through the week of Nov. is the defining feature of its brand, which can be one of the firm's most valuable assets and is how consumers will recognize and remember the firm for years to come.
In these contests, a firm (the sponsor; typically a small business or non-profit organization) solicits custom designs from freelance designers (players) in exchange for a fixed prize awarded to its favorite entry. The sponsor publishes a project brief which describes its business, its customers, and what it likes and seeks to communicate with its logo; specifies the prize structure; sets a deadline for submissions; and opens the contest to competition. While the contest is active, players can enter (and withdraw) as many designs as they want, at any time they want, and sponsors can provide players with private, real-time feedback on their submissions in the form of 1-to 5-star ratings and written commentary. Players see a gallery of competing designs and the distribution of ratings on these designs, but not the ratings on specific competing designs. Copyright is enforced. 8 At the end of the contest, the sponsor picks the winning design and receives the design files and full rights to their use. The platform then transfers payment to the winner.
For each contest in the sample, I observe the project brief, which includes a project title and those with multiple prizes or mid-contest rule changes such as prize increases or deadline extensions. Appendix B describes the sampling procedures in greater detail.
8 Though players can see competing designs, the site requires that all designs be original and enforces copyright protections. Players can also report violations if they believe a design to be copied or otherwise misused. Violators are permanently banned from the site. The site also prohibits the use of stock art and has a strict policy on the submission of overused design concepts. These mechanisms appear to be effective at limiting abuses.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology description, the sponsor's industry, and any specific elements that must be included in the logo; the contest's start and end dates; the prize amount; and whether the prize is committed (the sponsor may retain the option of not awarding the prize to any entries if none are to its liking). While multiple prizes are possible, the sample is restricted to contests with a single, winner-take-all prize. I also observe every submitted design, the identity of the designer, his or her history on the platform, the time at which the design was entered, the rating it received (if any), the time at which the rating was given, and whether it won the contest. I also observe when players withdraw designs from the competition, but I assume withdrawn entries remain in contention, as sponsors can request that any withdrawn design be reinstated. Since I do not observe written feedback, I assume the content of written commentary is fully summarized by the rating.
9
The player identifiers allow me to track players' activity over the course of each contest. I use the precise timing information to reconstruct the state of the contest at the time each design is submitted. For every design, I calculate the number of preceding designs in the contest of each rating. I do so both in terms of the feedback available (i.e., observed) at the time of submission as well as the feedback eventually provided. To account for the lags required to produce a design, I define preceding designs to be those entered at least one hour prior to a given design, and I similarly require that feedback be provided at least one hour prior to the given design's submission to be considered observed at the time it is made.
The dataset also includes the designs themselves. Recall that creativity bears the formal definition of the act of producing ideas that are novel and relevant to the goal at hand (Amabile
1996, Sternberg 2008). To operationalize this definition, I invoke image comparison algorithms
9 One of the threats to identification throughout the empirical analysis is that the estimated effects of ratings may be confounded by unobserved, written feedback: what seems to be a response to a rating could be a reaction to explicit direction provided by the sponsor. This concern is evaluated in detail in Appendix D and discussed later in the paper.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology commonly used in content-based image retrieval software (similar to Google Image's Search by Image feature) to measure the similarity of each design entered into a contest to preceding designs by the same and other players. I use two mathematically distinct procedures to compute similarity scores for image pairs, one of which is a preferred measure (the "perceptual hash" score) and the other of which is reserved for robustness checks (the "difference hash" score).
Appendix B explains how they work. Each algorithm takes a pair of digital images as inputs, summarizes them in terms of a specific, structural feature, and returns a similarity score in the [0,1] interval, with a value of one indicating a perfect match and a zero indicating total dissimilarity. This index effectively measures the absolute correlation of two images' underlying structure, reflecting similarities or differences in the basic shapes, outlines, and other elements that define the image.
To make this discussion concrete, Figure 1 demonstrates an example application. The figure shows three designs, entered in the order shown, by the same player in a logo design competition that is similar to those in the sample, although not necessarily from the same platform. 10 The first two logos have some features in common (they both use a circular frame and are presented against a similar backdrop), but they also have some stark differences. The perceptual hash algorithm gives them a similarity score of 0.31, and the difference hash algorithm scores them 0.51. The latter two logos are more alike, and though differences remain, they are now more limited and subtle. The perceptual hash algorithm gives these logos a similarity score of 0.71, and the difference hash scores them 0.89.
[ Figure 1 about here]
For each design in a contest, I compute its maximal similarity to previous designs in the same contest by the same player. Subtracting this value from one yields an index of originality between 0 and 1, which can be interpreted as an empirical counterpart to the parameter 1 /α in 10 To keep the sampled platform anonymous, I omit identifying information.
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology the model. In the empirical analysis, I primarily use measures of similarity to a player's highestrated previous submissions, rather than all of her prior submissions, but since players tend to re-use only their highest-rated work, these two measures are highly correlated in practice (ρ = 0.9 under either algorithm).
Creativity can manifest in this setting in other ways. For example, players sometimes create and enter several designs at once, and when doing so they can make each one similar to or distinct from the others. To capture this phenomenon, I define "batches" of proximate designs entered into the same contest by a single player and compute the maximum intra-batch similarity as a measure of creativity in batched work. Two designs are proximate if they are entered within 15 minutes of each other, and a batch is a set of designs in which every design in the set is proximate to another in the same set. Intra-batch similarity is an alternative measure of experimentation, reflecting players' tendency to try minor variants of the same concept versus multiple concepts over a short period of time.
These measures are not without drawbacks or immune to debate. One drawback is that algorithmic comparisons require substantial dimensionality reduction and thus provide only a coarse comparison between designs based on a select set of features. Concerns on this front are mitigated by the fact that the empirical results throughout the paper are similar in sign, significance, and magnitude under two distinct algorithms. In addition, coarse comparisons will be sufficient for detecting designs that are plainly tweaks to earlier work versus those that are not, which is the margin that matters most for this paper. One may also question how well the algorithms emulate human perception, but the example provided above assuages this concern, as do other examples in Appendix B, which discusses these issues in detail.
Characteristics of the Sample
The average contest in the data lasts eight days, offers a $250 prize, and attracts 96 designs from 33 players (Table 1) . On average, 64 percent of designs are rated, and less than three receive the top rating. Among rated designs, and the median and modal rating is three stars (Table 2) . Though fewer than four percent of rated designs receive a 5-star rating, over 40 percent of all winning designs are rated five stars, suggesting that these ratings convey substantial information about a design's quality and odds of success. 11 The website also provides formal guidance on the meaning of each star rating, which generates consistency in their interpretation and use across different sponsors and contests.
[ Table 2 about here]
The designs themselves are available for 96 percent of submissions in the sample, and Table   3 characterizes the similarity measures. For each design in the sample, we can compute its maximal similarity to previous designs by the same player, the highest-rated previous designs by the same player, and the highest-rated previous designs by that player's competitors (all in the same contest). For every design batch, I calculate the maximal similarity of any two designs in that batch.
[ Table 3 about here]
The table shows that new entries are on average more similar to that player's own designs than her competitors' designs, and that designs in the same batch tend to be more similar to each other than to previous designs by even the same player. But these averages mask more important patterns at the extremes. At the upper decile, designs can be very similar to previous work by the same player (≈ 0.75 under the perceptual hash algorithm) or to other designs in the same batch (0.91), but even the designs most similar to competing work are not all that similar (0.27). At the lower end, designs can be original by all of these measures.
11 Another 33 percent of winning designs are rated 4 stars, and 24 percent are unrated.
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Are ratings meaningful? Evidence from the empirical success function A simple cross-tabulation of ratings suggests that they are meaningful: in roughly two-thirds of contests, the winning design also had the highest rating in that contest (Appendix Table   C .3). But the relative value of each rating can be obtained by estimating an empirical success function, using the win-lose outcomes of each design in a large sample of contests from this platform, which I borrow from Gross (2017).
12 Recall from Section 1 that a design's latent value is a function of its rating and an i.i.d. type-I E.V. error. In the data, there are five possible ratings, such that this latent value can be flexibly specified with fixed effects for each rating and the success function estimated as a conditional logit. To formalize, let R ijk denote the rating on design i by player j in contest k, and (in a slight abuse of notation) let R ijk = ∅ when design ijk is unrated. The value of each design, ν ijk , can be written as:
The details of the estimation are provided in Appendix C, but here we can summarize the results, which will be used in later analysis. The fixed effects are monotonically increasing in the rating and precisely estimated. Only a 5-star design is on average preferred to the outside option. To produce the same increase in a player's estimated win probability as generated by a five-star design, a player would need 12 four-star designs, 137 three-star designs, or nearly 2,000 one-star designs. The magnitudes of these differences imply that for players with a top rating, competitive pressure primarily comes from other top-rated designs. As a measure of fit, the odds-on favorite wins almost half of all contests in the sample. With knowledge of the 12 Estimating the success function requires a larger sample of winners, and thus contests, than are in the primary sample of this paper. As Appendix C shows, the sample in Gross (2017) contains >4,000 contests, is empirically comparable, and includes all of the same variables except for the images themselves -sufficient for the exercise. Concretely, the analysis compares the actions of players who have received the top rating or who know they face top-rated competition aginst those who do not -whether it is because no prior designs will be given the top rating, or because these ratings have simply not yet been administered. The identifying assumption is that there are no omitted factors correlated with observed feedback that also affect choices. This assumption is supported by two pieces of evidence. First, the arrival of ratings is unpredictable, such that the set of ratings observed at any point in time is effectively random: sponsors are erratic, and it is difficult to know exactly when or how often a sponsor will log onto the site to rate new entries, much less whether or when they will rate any single design. More importantly, players' choices are uncorrelated with ratings that were unobserved at the time, including forthcoming ratings and ratings on specific competing submissions.
Empirical Methods and Identification

13
To establish that feedback provision is unpredictable, I explore the relationship between feedback lags and ratings. In concept, sponsors may be quicker to rate the designs they like the 13 Though this setting may seem like a natural opportunity for a controlled experiment, the variation of interest is in the 5-star ratings, which are sufficiently rare that a controlled intervention would require either unrealistic manipulation or an infeasibly large sample. I therefore exploit naturally-occurring variation for this study. in hours or as a percent of the total contest duration, the lag between when a design is entered and rated is unrelated to its rating. The probability that a rated design was rated before versus after the contest ends is similarly idiosyncratic.
Evidence that choices are uncorrelated with unobserved or not-yet-observed ratings is presented in Section 3. Following the discussion of the focal results, I show that the relationship between the similarity measures and forthcoming ratings is indistinguishable from zero. In unreported tests, I also examine players' tendency to imitate highly-rated competing designs and find no such patterns, likely because they simply do not know which designs are highly rated (and thus which ones to imitate). These collective results suggest that players respond only to ratings observed at the time of design.
Finally, a distinct threat to identification arises if ratings are accompanied by written feedback, and these comments provide explicit instruction that generates the patterns found in this paper. Appendix D evaluates this possibility in detail, using a newly-drawn sample of contests in which written comments were made visible to the public, seemingly by error. Within this sample, sponsors provided written comments to fewer than 8 percent of submissions, though the frequency is significantly higher for highly-rated submissions than for poorly-rated submissions. These comments take a range of flavors, with many echoing the rating given, but some make a more explicit request or suggestion of content changes. Because the latter present the risk of confounding the results of this paper, I hired individuals to read every comment in this sample and determine whether the sponsor suggested specific changes. Using this measure, I find that instructive comments are (i) rare, (ii) not disproportionately provided to 5-star designs relative to 3-or 4-star designs, and most importantly (iii) not related to the presence of high-rated competition, such that they cannot be responsible for differences in behavior that will be found in the analysis below.
00831 9
Review of Economics and Statistics
Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Interpretation: Feedback versus Market Structure
Although the phenomenological focus of the paper is on the effects of market structure on creativity, the identifying variation is generated by feedback, raising the question of whether the empirical results should be attributed to "feedback" or to "market structure" -though the distinction is blurred by the fact that in this setting, feedback is information about market structure. To orient this question, it is helpful to observe that feedback can affect choices through two channels in this setting. The rating on a given design will (i) help that player understand whether it is good or bad, and thereby project how her next design might be rated if she enters something similar to it versus different. But that rating, together with knowledge of the ratings given to competitors, will also (ii) inform her whether her probability of winning is high or low -and if the player's objective is to win, this probability is fundamentally what will be driving behavior in these contests, as in the model in Section 1. In the following sections, I therefore refer to the effect of a player's own ratings as an effect of feedback or (for example) of a high rating, and to the effect of competitors' ratings as an effect of high-rated competition, with the primary focus being the latter.
Competition and Creativity
Figure 2 provides a first-cut, visual preview of this section's results. The figure shows the distribution of designs' maximal similarity to previous submissions by the same player, conditioning on that player's best rating and whether top-rated competition was present at the time. Recall that low similarity scores indicate that the submission is substantively original, while high scores indicate that it is a variant on a prior entry. Submissions from players with high ratings are significantly more similar to their prior work, with the effects largest for those with a 5-star rating (bottom-right panel). However, these very same players are more likely to enter original designs when facing top-rated competition than in its absence.
[ Figure 2 about here] 22 00831 9
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The richness of the field setting makes it possible to evaluate whether competition affects highperforming players' tendency to enter more original work in a variety of ways. The estimating equation in this part of the paper is as follows, with variants estimated throughout this section and in the appendix:
where i indexes designs by player j in contest k. Similarity ijk represents the maximal similarity of design ijk to the highest-rated preceding designs by player j in contest k;R ijk is the highest rating received by player j in contest k prior to design ijk;R -ijk is the highest rating received by player j's competitors prior to design ijk; P k is the prize in contest k (in $100s); T ijk is fraction of the contest elapsed when design ijk is entered; X ijk consists of other design-level controls, including counts of previous designs by the same player and by competitors, and the number of days remaining in the contest; and ζ k and ϕ j are contest and player fixed effects.
Specifications without contest fixed effects include P k as a standalone explanatory variable to identify the interaction. Standard errors throughout are clustered by player to account for any within-player correlation in the error term, though the results are robust to (and more conservative than) clustering by contest-player or by contest.
Similarity of new designs to a player's previous designs
I begin by examining players' tendency to enter novel versus derivative designs. Table 4 provides estimates from regressions of the maximal similarity of each design to the highest-rated preceding designs by the same player on indicators for the highest rating received. Column (1) presents a baseline with no fixed effects or other controls. Columns (2) and (3) add fixed effects 23 00831 9
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for contests and players, respectively, and Column (4) includes both. Column (5) additionally controls for the number of days remaining in the contest and the number of prior submissions by the same player as well as competing players.
[ Table 4 about here]
Similar patterns are observed across all specifications. In the regression with both fixed effects and controls (Column 5), we see that players with the top rating enter designs that are 0.36 points, or over one full standard deviation, more similar to their previous work than players who have only low ratings or no ratings. Roughly half of this effect is reversed by the presence of top-rated competition, with this counteracting effect significant at the one percent level. When a player's highest rating is four stars, her new designs are on average around 0.1 points more similar to previous work. This effect further attenuates as the best observed rating declines until it is indistinguishable from zero at a best rating of two stars, with all such differences statistically significant. High-rated competition is not observed to have an effect on similarity for these lower performers, who are already unlikely to reuse their low-rated submissions.
The latter regressions in Table 4 use contest and player fixed effects to control for other factors that are either common to all players within a contest or across all contests for a given player, but they do not control for factors that are constant for a given player within specific contests, as doing so leaves too little variation to identify the focal effects. Such factors could nevertheless be confounding, such as if players who continue participating in different competitive conditions are systematically more or less likely to enter similar designs in that contest. The estimates in the previous tables additionally mask potential heterogeneity in players' reactions to competitive conditions over the course of a contest. The independent variables are changes in indicators for the highest rating the player has received, interacting the indicator for the top rating with the prize and the presence of toprated competition. I estimate this model with the same configurations of contest fixed effects, player fixed effects, and controls to account for other potential reasons why players' propensity for similarity changes over time.
[ Table 5 about here]
The results provide even stronger evidence of how competition affects creative choices and are statistically and quantitatively similar across specifications. A player who receives her first 5-star rating will typically then enter a near replica: the similarity increases by 0.9 points, or over three standard deviations, relative to players with low ratings. Top-rated competition again reverses roughly half of this effect, with the difference significant at the one percent level. Given their magnitudes, these effects will be plainly visible to the naked eye ( Figure 1 in Section 2 gives an example of what they would look like in practice). The effects of a new best rating of four, three, or two stars attenuate monotonically, similar to earlier results, and high-rated competition is not seen to have an effect on low performers.
14
The appendix provides robustness checks and supplementary analysis. In Appendix E, I show that similar patterns exist for experimentation within submission batches, and that they also arise for 4-on-4 competition (i.e., players with 4-star ratings and 4-star competition) when no 5-star ratings have been granted. Appendix E also examines the originality of players' initial submissions in a contest (measured against previous submissions by others in that contest, by 14 Interestingly, these regressions also find that new recipients of a top rating can be induced to explore new designs by larger prizes. The theory suggests a possible explanation: large prizes moderate the influence of costs in players' decision-making. If original designs are more costly (take more time/effort) than tweaks, they may be more worthwhile when the prize is large. This is particularly the case for players with highly-rated work in the contest.
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To confirm that these patterns are not an artifact of the perceptual hash algorithm, Appendix F re-estimates the regressions in the preceding tables using the difference hash algorithm to calculate similarity scores. The results are both statistically and quantitatively similar. In Appendix G, I split out the effects of competition by the number of top-rated competing designs, finding no statistical differences between the effects of one versus more than one: all of the effects of competition are achieved by one high-quality competitor.
This latter result is especially important for ruling out an information-based story. In particular, the presence of other 5-star ratings might indicate that the sponsor has diverse preferences, and that unique designs have higher likelihood of being well-received than one might otherwise believe. If this were the case, then similarity should continue to decline as 5-star competitors are revealed. That this is not the case suggests that the effect is in fact the result of variation in incentives from competition.
In unreported tests, I also look for effects of 5-star competition on players with only 4-star designs, and find attenuated effects that are negative but not significantly different from zero.
Placebo test: Similarity to a player's not-yet-rated designs
The identifying assumptions require that players are not acting on information that correlates with feedback but is unobserved in the data. As a simple validation exercise, the regressions in Table 6 perform a placebo test of whether similarity is related to impending feedback. If an omitted determinant of creative choices is correlated with ratings and biasing the results, then it would appear as if similarity responds to forthcoming ratings. If the identifying assumptions hold, we should see only zeros.
[ Table 6 about here]
The specification in Column (1) regresses a design's maximal similarity to the player's best designs that have not yet been but will eventually be rated on indicators for the ratings they later receive. I find no evidence that designs' similarity is related to forthcoming ratings.
Because a given design's similarity to a not-yet-rated design can be incidental if both are tweaks on a third design, Column (2) controls for similarity to the best already-rated design.
Column (3) allows this control to vary with this existing rating. As a final check, I isolate the similarity to the not-yet-rated design that cannot be explained by similarity to the third design in the form of a residual, and in Column (4) I regress these residuals on the same independent variables. In all cases, I find no evidence that players tweak designs with higher forthcoming ratings. Choices are only correlated with ratings observed in advance.
Effects on Participation
The analysis thus far conditions on continued participation: the unit of observation is a submission, and the outcome is its similarity to previous submissions. However, players can also stop making submissions if they perceive the returns to effort to be low. This outside option is selection into the contest on the intensity of competition might explain the results, and find similar effects for both groups.
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To incorporate the outside option into the empirics, I discretize outcomes and model each submission as a choice between three options: (i) entering a tweak and remaining active ("tweak"),
(ii) entering an original design and remaining active ("original"), or (iii) entering any design and refraining from further submissions ("abandon") . Although the precise moment that a player decides to stop investing effort is not observable, we can use inactivity as a proxy. The unit of observation thus remains an individual submission, but I now categorize designs as original or as a tweak on the basis of discrete cutoffs for similarity scores, and I identify designs which are its creator's final submission into each contest.
16
The multinomial choice framework is necessary because the tradeoffs between three unordered options (tweak, original, or abandon) cannot be evaluated in a linear model. For this exercise, I classify a design as a tweak if its similarity to any earlier design by the same player is 0.7 or higher and original if its maximal similarity to previous designs by that player is 0.3 or lower.
17 Designs with intermediate similarity scores are omitted from the exercise, as the 16 Note that this measure cannot distinguish a player who stops competing immediately after their final submission from one who waits for more information but later stops competing without additional entries. Because the end result is the same, the distinction is not critical for the purposes of this paper, as both behaviors will be influenced by information available at the time of the final submission. Anecdotally, according to some designers on this platform, it is often the case that players will enter their final design knowing it is their final design and not look back.
17 Because the distribution of similarity scores is continuous in the data, there is not an obvious utility as a function of the player's contemporaneous probability of winning (computed using the conditional logit estimates described in Section 2), the fraction of the contest transpired, the number of days remaining, and a logit error term:
where Pr(Win) ijk is the player's projected probability of winning at the time submission ijk is made, T ijk is fraction of the contest elapsed, D ijk is the number of days remaining in the contest, and ε a ijk is distributed i.i.d. type-I E.V. Controlling for the fraction of the contest transpired and number of days remaining is especially important here, as abandonment is mechanically more likely to be observed later in a contest.
I estimate the parameters by maximum likelihood using observed behavior. I then use the results to compute the probability that a player takes each of the three actions near the end of a contest as her chances of winning vary from one to zero. These probabilities are shown in Figure 3 . Panel A plots the probability that the player tweaks; Panel B, that she enters an original design; and Panel C, that she does either but then quits. The bars around each point span the associated 95 percent confidence intervals.
[ Figure 3 about here]
The probability that a player tweaks and remains active (Panel A) peaks at 70 percent when she is a strong favorite and declines monotonically to zero with her odds of winning. The probability that the player produces an original design (Panel B) follows a distinct and highly significant inverted-U pattern, peaking at approximately a one-half odds of winning. Finally, the probability that she abandons (Panel C) increases from zero to around 80 percent as her odds of winning fall to zero. More flexible specifications, including higher-order polynomials 29 00831 9
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The evidence above is an important reminder that players may stop submitting designs when competition grows severe. Taken together, the evidence reveals that incentives for creativity are greatest with balanced competition: too little, and high-performers lack incentive to develop new ideas; too much, and agents stop investing effort altogether. As Appendix E shows, in the data it appears that creative effort is most attractive to high-rated players when faced off against exactly one high-rated competitor.
Mechanisms: Creativity and Risk
Why do these players respond to competition by entering more original work? In conversations with creative professionals, including the panelists hired for the exercise below, several claimed that competition requires them to "be bold" or "bring the 'wow' factor," and that it induces them to take on more creative risk. The key assumption of this interpretation is that creativity is both riskier and higher reward than incremental changes -but whether or not this is true is fundamentally an empirical question.
A natural approach to answering this question might be to look at the distribution of sponsors' ratings on original designs versus tweaks, conditioning on the rating of the tweaked design (for tweaks) or the player's highest prior rating (for originals). Original designs after a low rating are on average higher-rated than tweaks to designs with low ratings, but original designs after a high rating are on average lower-rated than tweaks of top-rated designs, raising the question of why a player would deviate from her top-rated work.
The problem with this approach is that ratings are censored: it is impossible to observe im- sample that were rated five stars by contest sponsors, and I use the panelists' ratings to evaluate whether creativity is in fact a high-risk, high-return activity, by comparing the distribution of panelist ratings on tweaks and original designs within this subsample.
The ratings exercise and results are presented in Appendix H, and here I summarize the results.
The mean, median, and maximum panelist rating on original designs is on average higher than that on tweaks, with differences on the order of half of a standard deviation and significant at the one percent level. But the level of disagreement (standard deviation) among them is significantly higher as well. This evidence reinforces a possible link between creativity and risktaking suggested by research in other fields, such as social psychology and neuroscience (e.g., Dewett 2006, who finds that a willingness to take risks is positively associated with employees' creativity in the workplace, and Limb and Braun 2008, who show with fMRI data that jazz pianists' prefrontal cortex -the part of the brain responsible for planning, decision-making, and self-regulation -deactivates during improvisation).
Implications and Conclusion
Within this sample of commercial logo design competitions, I thus find that high-powered incentives have nuanced, multifaceted effects on individuals' creative output: some competition is needed to motivate high performers to develop original, untested ideas over tweaking their earlier work, but heavy competition drives them to stop investing altogether. When the two effects are considered in tandem, the evidence indicates that the likelihood that an agent produces original work is greatest with one competitor of similar ability. The results can be rationalized by a model in which creativity is inherently risky, such that creative effort involves a choice over risk. As such, the paper ties together literatures in the social psychology of creativity and the economics of tournament competition, and provides new evidence on how competition shapes the intensity and direction of individuals' creative production.
The results have direct implications for the use of incentives as a tool for promoting creativity. The foremost lesson is that competition can motivate creativity in professional settings, 31 00831 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology provided it is balanced. In designing contracts for creative workers, managers ought thus consider incentives for high-quality work relative to that of peers or colleagues, in addition to the more traditional strategy of establishing a work environment with intrinsic motivators such as freedom, flexibility, and challenge. Note that the reward need not be pecuniary: the same intuition applies when workers value recognition or status.
In practice, this 'Goldilocks' level of competition may be difficult to achieve, let alone determine, and finding it would likely require experimentation with the mechanism itself by a principal in another setting. In this paper, the presence of one high-quality competitor was found to be sufficient to induce another high-quality player to produce original designs. A natural conjecture for other settings may be that a few (perhaps even one) competitor of similar ability is enough to elicit creativity, while the presence of many such competitors would be more harmful than helpful for motivating creative output -although the precise thresholds may also depend on other features of the setting, such as the prize distribution.
The results are also relevant to innovation procurement practices, particularly as governments, private foundations, and firms increasingly contract for R&D through prizes and institutionalize prize competition.
18 Yet the applications are more general than R&D prizes alone: as earlier discussion explains, the mechanism in this paper is fundamentally an RFP, a standard contracting device used by firms and government agencies to solicit designs or prototypes of new products, systems, and technologies, with a prize or production contract awarded to the preferred submission. These competitions often take place over multiple rounds, with performance scored between, much like the contests studied here. Caution is nonetheless warranted in drawing external inference to other procurement settings, as the product being procured in this paper (a logo) is relatively simple, and proposals are heavily tailored to each client. Another potential challenge to external validity is the absence of objective evaluation criteria: the ratings and winner selection are inherently at the sponsor's subjective discretion. Yet in many RFPs, evaluation criteria similarly leave room for subjective judgments or are otherwise opaque to participants. More importantly, the defining feature of the R&D problem is not the ambiguity of the evaluation criteria, but rather the uncertainty around how any given product design will perform until it is tested and its performance is revealed. This uncertainty is present in all competitive R&D settings.
The final contribution is more methodological in its nature: this paper introduces new tools for measuring innovation in terms of its content. Whereas most recent attempts at content-based analysis of innovation have focused on textual analysis of patents, this paper demonstrates that even unpatentable ideas can be quantified, and it exploits a data-rich setting to study (1) and (2) and a score of 0.711 for (2) and (3). The difference hash algorithm calculates similarity scores of 0.508 for (1) and (2) [-1,1] , where a value of 0 indicates that the player's current design is as similar to her best preceding design as was her previous design, and a value of 1 indicates that the player transitioned fully from innovating to recycling (and a value of -1, the converse). Column (5) controls for the number of days remaining and number of previous designs entered by the player and her competitors. Similarity scores in this table are calculated using a perceptual hash algorithm. Preceding designs/ratings are defined to be those entered/provided at least 60 minutes prior to the given design. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by player in parentheses. (3) is a continuous measure of a design's similarity to the best design that the player has previously entered that has yet to but will eventually be rated, taking values in [0, 1] , where a value of 1 indicates that the two designs are identical. Under the identifying assumption that future feedback is unpredictable, current choices should be unrelated to forthcoming ratings. Note that a given design's similarity to an earlier, unrated design can be incidental if they are both tweaks on a rated third design. To account for this possibility, Column (2) controls for the given and unrated designs' similarity to the best previously-rated design. Column (3) allows these controls to vary with the highest rating previously received. Dependent variable in Column (4) is the residual from a regression of the dependent variable in the previous columns on these controls. These residuals will be the subset of a given design's similarity to the unrated design that is not explained by jointly-occurring similarity to a third design. All columns control for days remaining and number of previous designs by the player and her competitors. Similarity scores in this table are calculated using a perceptual hash algorithm. Preceding designs/ratings are defined to be those entered/provided at least 60 minutes prior to the given design. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by player in parentheses.
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